Following a high number of attacks and casualties throughout 1998, terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija continued in early 1999. On January 2, two Serbs were killed in Kosovska Mitrovica, and on January 8, terrorists killed three police officers on the Pristina\u2013Prizren road, while eight soldiers were kidnapped in Stari Trg.<\/p>\n
During this period, attacks on members of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) in Kosovo and Metohija were particularly intense in the \u0160timlje area. Consequently, strong police forces, supported by the army, conducted an anti-terrorist operation on January 15, 1999, resulting in the death of 44 Albanians in the vicinity of the village of Ra\u010dak.<\/p>\n
Despite varying interpretations of the events regarding the combat that took place that day, and although a serious investigation was yet to be conducted, the West\u2014primarily through the voice of the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, William Walker\u2014accused Yugoslav security forces of a massacre of innocent civilians. This act initiated a series of diplomatic pressures and negotiations. NATO air strikes against Serbia were increasingly being announced.<\/p>\n
Twenty days after the Ra\u010dak incident, negotiations began on February 6 between Serbian authorities and representatives of Kosovo Albanians at the summer residence of the French President in Rambouillet, near Paris. The Serbian delegation could not accept the entry of NATO troops into Yugoslavia, which proved to be the greatest obstacle to accepting the proposed document. Additionally, the Albanian side insisted on specific mechanisms that would allow for secession from Serbia. The negotiations ended on February 23 without any result. In the following days, diplomatic contacts intensified, with representatives of major powers visiting Belgrade to speak with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107.<\/p>\n
On March 15, negotiations between the delegations of the Republic of Serbia and Albanians from Kosovo, continued in Paris. The next day, on March 16, the international community's Contact Group rejected all objections raised by the Serbian delegation regarding the political part of the proposed agreement. On March 18, the Albanian delegation signed the offered agreement, even though their demand for a clear statement that the final status of Kosovo would be determined by referendum was not met. Serbia persistently refused to accept the ultimatum, particularly the military annex of the agreement, which granted NATO forces the right to move across Serbian territory as they pleased.<\/p>\n
The ultimatum was \"absolutely unacceptable\" for a sovereign country and was presented in a way that placed the Serbian side in a difficult, nearly impossible position, leading to accusations of non-cooperation. To demonstrate its readiness for negotiations, the Serbian delegation signed the \"Agreement on Self-Governance in Kosmet,\" which it had drafted and submitted during the previous negotiations in Rambouillet.<\/p>\n
The failure of the negotiations was announced on March 19, and the OSCE announced the withdrawal of international observers (the Kosovo Verification Mission). On March 23, based on information regarding preparations for NATO aggression, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared a state of imminent threat of war. Later, that same evening, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana allowed the authorization \"to initiate air operations against Yugoslavia.\" NATO \"justified\" its actions to the world public with a narrative of military action to supposedly prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and Metohija. Every effort was made to create the impression that brutal force was a last resort after exhausting all diplomatic means. This attack violated numerous international regulations, most significantly the UN Charter, which is based on the equality of all members and prohibits the conduct of war except with the approval of the Security Council\u2014which NATO did not have.<\/p>\n
Operation Allied Force, aimed at conducting air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, began on March 24, 1999, at 19:41, when military facilities in the wider Pristina area were bombed. A few hours later, the FRY Government declared a \"state of war because aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has begun.\"<\/p>\n
The aggression against Yugoslavia was initiated by 16 NATO member states, joined later in April 1999 by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Greece did not allow its forces to be involved in the bombing, while Luxembourg and Iceland do not have their own armies. NATO air forces were deployed across 59 bases in 12 countries, with the largest concentration in Italy (59%). Naval aviation was based on the American aircraft carrier Enterprise, the helicopter carrier Nassau, and the French aircraft carrier Foch in the Ionian and Adriatic Seas.<\/p>\n
Over the 78 days of aggression, NATO aviation carried out over 26,000 sorties, 18,168 (70%) of which were combat missions. Although the initial plan involved 464 aircraft and about 450 cruise missiles, by the end of the 78 days, approximately 1,040 aircraft were used and about 1,000 cruise missiles were fired. The number of targets defined at the start of the war was around 300, but this increased to nearly 4,000 by the end. Approximately 350,000 cluster bombs (\"submunitions\") were launched, along with about 50,000 rounds of depleted uranium ammunition and 15,000 large projectiles (unguided and guided bombs and missiles), totaling about 22,000 tons.<\/p>\n
In the early days, air strikes targeted missile and radar systems, television and radio transmitters, military positions, and airfields. The target list quickly expanded to state institutions and civilian targets in villages and towns, causing immense damage to the economy and transport. In Belgrade, buildings with no military significance were hit, including the Federal and Republican Ministries of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the headquarters of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and several TV and radio stations in the \"U\u0161\u0107e\" Business Center. On April 22, the residence of the FRY President at U\u017ei\u010dka 15 was hit. At around 2:00 AM on April 23, the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) building in Aberdareva Street was directly hit, killing 16 employees. The Embassy of the People's Republic of China was also hit, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese citizens.<\/p>\n
Numerous communication links and bridges\u2014both road and rail\u2014were also targeted, most of which served no significant military purpose; their destruction was intended to send symbolic messages of NATO's superiority and to contribute to the demoralization and intimidation of the population.<\/p>\n
As the bombing progressed, strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure became more frequent. On the evening of April 5, 1999, the center of Aleksinac was rocketed, killing 11 and injuring over 50. On April 7, the center of Pristina was bombed, killing 19 people, including the five-member Gashi family. On April 12, an international train on the Belgrade\u2013Thessaloniki line was hit by multiple missiles on the bridge over the South Morava in the Grdelica Gorge; 15 passengers died. On April 14, a refugee column of Albanians was rocketed near the Terzijski Bridge, killing 61 people. On April 27, Surdulica was bombed, and a hit on the Mili\u0107 family home killed nine people.<\/p>\n
During the NATO aggression, numerous children were also victims of senseless attacks on civilian targets. The symbol of their suffering became little Milica Raki\u0107, born in 1996, who was killed in Batajnica on April 17, 1999. Before that, in Merdare on April 11, eleven-month-old Bojana To\u0161ovi\u0107 was killed; she perished along with her father. In Novi Pazar, on May 31, 1999, nine people were killed by a NATO bomb, among them two-year-old Marko Simi\u0107 and his father Vladan Simi\u0107 (30). Victims of NATO projectiles were also sister and brother, Dajana and Stefan Pavlovi\u0107, who were killed in the town of Ralja. Little Dragana Dimi\u0107 was also killed in Pristina, in Staro Gracko, by a cluster bomb that pierced the ceiling and fell on her bed. Her father, Sini\u0161a, carried her decapitated body to the Pristina hospital. These are only data on individual victims\u2014innocent children, whose list during the bombing was, unfortunately, much larger.<\/p>\n
From May 1999, the aggression intensified with strikes on the power grid, refineries, fuel depots, and mines, causing widespread damage to the economy and the population.<\/p>\n
The Army of Yugoslavia, namely its Air Force and Air Defense forces (RV i PVO), organized and courageously carried out the defense of the country in accordance with its capabilities, with the primary goal of minimizing losses in its own personnel and military equipment, as well as achieving the realistically possible effects of combat against an aggressor who, along with numerical superiority, possessed weapons and tools of the latest generation. The army relied on the skills of its personnel; thus, all pieces of military equipment, as well as airfields and other large military facilities, were expertly camouflaged. Unit maneuvers were one of the organized ways of deceiving the aggressor, so that through organized and deliberate maneuvering, forces were successfully preserved and favorable conditions for the defense of the country against the attacker were secured. Additionally, the construction of mock-ups, i.e., false targets representing the equipment of the Yugoslav Army, yielded very successful results. These measures had a multifaceted effect in reducing losses in personnel and military equipment. Although using significantly older equipment, including aircraft with considerably lower technical capabilities than the attacker, pilots and other members of the RV i PVO entered into combat with the aggressor.<\/p>\n
On May 4, 1999, at around 12:00 PM, a large group of NATO aircraft was spotted acting in the direction of Valjevo, mainly targeting the \"Kru\u0161ik\" munitions factory as well as military depots in the surrounding area. Although a younger officer received the command to take off, Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Pavlovi\u0107 ordered via telephone for the summoned pilot to be held back, and instead, he took off toward Valjevo in his MiG-29. He soon found himself in the sky above Valjevo; however, due to technical problems with the aircraft, he was left without radar. Even this did not deter him, and Pavlovi\u0107 engaged in an unequal battle against 16 NATO aircraft, succeeding in confusing them with his bold approach and even forcing them into retreat. But soon, at approximately 12:45 PM, he was hit by three missiles fired by Dutch pilots in F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft located west of Tuzla, which he could not even detect. He died while still in the air. The remains of his plane fell in the village of Petnica. In the post-war period, Milenko Pavlovi\u0107 became one of the symbols of the bravery of the heroes of resistance against foreign attackers on Serbia and Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n
During the 78 days of the war, members of the RV i PVO (Air Force and Air Defense), in an unequal struggle, shot down 2 enemy aircraft (an F-117A and an F-16C); 9 unmanned aerial vehicles; 45 cruise missiles; and 4 large projectiles. The aforementioned equipment was hit in the airspace of the FRY, and its remains fell on the territory of Yugoslavia, providing verifiable material evidence for their downing. The United States Air Force Lockheed F-117A Night Hawk, with markings AF 82 806 HO (Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico), was shot down on March 27, 1999, on the fourth day of the NATO bombing. It was shot down by the 3rd Division of the 250th Missile Air Defense Brigade of the Yugoslav Army, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Zolt\u00e1n Dani. The aircraft was hit by a Russian S-125 Neva missile system. Disabled for further flight, the plane crashed in the area of the Srem village of Bu\u0111anovci near Ruma. This was a major shock for the NATO command and all those who were convinced of the invulnerability of the latest American technology. At the same time, it was an event of great significance for maintaining the morale of the army and the population of Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n
In addition to the aforementioned downed combat assets, the Air Defense forces of the strategic grouping of the RV i PVO of the VJ damaged or shot down a significant number of other enemy aircraft and missiles. Certain sources cite 36 airplanes and 2 helicopters whose remains were not found on the territory of the FR Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n
In addition to extensive air attacks, members of the Yugoslav Army resolutely opposed the ground aggression of Albanian forces supported by the NATO pact. Thus, in the early morning hours of April 9, 1999, an attempted ground breakthrough into the territory of Yugoslavia began. With strong artillery support, Albanian forces, acting practically as NATO infantry, attempted to cross the Albanian-Yugoslav border in the area of the Ko\u0161are border post near \u0110akovica. At that point, the attacker encountered significant resistance from Yugoslav forces, and a major battle ensued. Later, high-intensity fighting in this region lasted until the end of the NATO aggression against the FRY. Besides attacks by terrorists and the Albanian army on the border belt, significant strikes by NATO aviation were also carried out.<\/p>\n
Due to the intensity of the air, artillery, and infantry strikes, the battles around the Ko\u0161are border post and the mountain peaks of Maja Glava and Rasa Ko\u0161ares are often referred to as the \"Hell of Ko\u0161are.\" Because of their exceptional sacrifice, the Yugoslav soldiers who participated in them will be remembered with a special degree of piety as heroes of the defense of the people and the state. Forceful ground strikes on May 26 were also directed at the Goro\u017eup border post near Prizren.<\/p>\n
Since Operation \"Arrow 1\" (\"Ko\u0161are\") failed, NATO, along with the KLA headquarters and Albanian forces, planned a second operation \u2013 \"Arrow 2.\" After 45 days of heavy and bloody fighting, NATO strategists realized that creating a bridgehead in the Ko\u0161are region, intended to open a path for inserting NATO forces from Albania, had not succeeded, so they moved to a backup variant \u2013 a breakthrough over Mount Pa\u0161trik. To assist the advance of Albanian terrorists toward Prizren, NATO used strategic aviation 24 times, leaving true devastation on the slopes of Pa\u0161trik.<\/p>\n
In the aggression against the FR Yugoslavia, approximately 2,500 civilians and soldiers were killed. Enormous material and infrastructural destruction was inflicted upon the country, but the ground advance of enemy forces was stopped. Under the threat of new bombings and amid great diplomatic pressure, combat operations ended after 78 days. Namely, on June 9, in Kumanovo, Macedonia, the Military-Technical Agreement was signed between the International Security Forces and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, ending hostilities between NATO and the FRY, while Serbian security forces committed to withdrawing from Kosovo and Metohija.<\/p>\n
The Kumanovo Agreement established a Ground Safety Zone five kilometers wide, \"extending beyond the borders of the province of Kosovo toward the rest of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,\" and an Air Safety Zone 25 kilometers wide. Also, international forces committed to fully disarming the KLA.<\/p>\n
On June 10, 1999, based on the Kumanovo Agreement, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which introduced international administration in Kosovo and Metohija. Parallel to the withdrawal of the Serbian army and police, starting from June 12, members of the international Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered the territory of the southern Serbian province. The last soldier of the defense left the territory of the AP KiM on June 20, and by a decision of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia on June 26, the state of war was abolished. However, the suffering of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija continued with new intensity and brutality carried out by Albanian formations taking over the territory. Although the resolution stated that a certain number of Serbian personnel would be allowed to return to maintain a presence at Serbian historical sites and administrative crossings, this was never realized.<\/p>\n