At the beginning of July 1993, the Main Staff of the VRS began the implementation of a new operation, \"Lukavac 93,\" whose goal was the liberation of Trnovo. In this area during the summer of 1992, Muslim forces had expelled the Serbian population and forces and committed war crimes.<\/p>\n
The core idea of the VRS operation was to penetrate toward Trnovo from three directions, push back and split the Muslim formations on the Trnovo\u2013Gora\u017ede line, and subsequently seize the mountain peaks of Igman, Treskavica, and Bjela\u0161nica.<\/p>\n
The operation began on July 6, 1993. Units of the Sarajevo-Romanija and Herzegovinian Corps of the VRS advanced along planned directions, supported by artillery from Jahorina. Trnovo was liberated on July 11, 1993.<\/p>\n
The following day, the forces of the corps engaged in this operation met in Trnovo. Taking advantage of the disarray within the Muslim forces following the fall of Trnovo, Rogoj, and Grebak, Serbian forces extended their operations and captured all the villages on the southern slopes of Igman.<\/p>\n
It was clear to the VRS leadership that whoever controls Igman and Bjela\u0161nica effectively controls Sarajevo as well. Battles were fought on Igman from July 19 to 28, resulting in the liberation of the peak of Bjela\u0161nica and Mount Igman.<\/p>\n
Through this successful operation, the Serbian forces of the VRS not only called into question the survival of Muslim forces in Sarajevo but also completely cut off the Muslim territories of Gora\u017ede and connected the Sarajevo-Romanija and Herzegovinian Corps\u2014effectively linking the territories of Romanija with Herzegovina.<\/p>\n
The battle for Rogoj and Trnovo was key for the Serbian army's breakthrough to Igman and Bjela\u0161nica\u2014two strategic heights that opened roads toward Sarajevo and Konjic.<\/p>\n
Operation \"Lukavac 93\" was the greatest military success of 1993. It presented the possibility of ending the war by having VRS forces enter parts of, or even the entirety of, Sarajevo under Muslim control, which would have meant a de facto military victory in the war.<\/p>\n
However, peace negotiations were underway in Geneva, and massive pressure was exerted on the civilian leadership of Republika Srpska under the threat of NATO bombing. In response, President Karad\u017ei\u0107 made the move to enter negotiations regarding the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Igman and Bjela\u0161nica. The pressure from the international community bore fruit: under pressure from the President, General Mladi\u0107 accepted this political decision.<\/p>\n
Thus, as early as August 10, and in accordance with a previous order from President Karad\u017ei\u0107, Serbian forces withdrew from Igman and Bjela\u0161nica. The positions captured in the battles of the previous month\u2014paid for with the lives of VRS fighters\u2014were handed over to UNPROFOR forces as agreed.<\/p>\n
Although the intent was there from the start, it was three months later\u2014when enough time had passed so the deception would not be as obvious\u2014that the UN forces withdrew. On November 4, 1993, the forces of the so-called Army of BiH took over Igman, Bjela\u0161nica, and Treskavica, as well as all the villages above Trnovo toward Treskavica and Bjela\u0161nica. They later exploited this position to commit certain crimes against Serbs.<\/p>\n
Operation \"Lukavac 93\" was one of the most brilliant military victories of the VRS, but at the same time, it represented a stumbling block between the military and political leadership regarding how to end the war.<\/p>\n
The military leadership favored defeating the enemy on the battlefield and in its capital, while the political leadership, exposed to intense external political pressure, decided that the war should be ended through negotiations.<\/p>\n
This action also demonstrated the hypocrisy of the West and NATO, who were becoming increasingly and openly involved in the war on the side of the Croat-Muslim coalition.<\/p>\n